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 “No means no.” “It’s on us.” “Me too.” 
 
At first glance, these phrases seem trivial and inconsequential. 
Couple them with the power of social media and a simple “hashtag,” 
however, and they quickly become prevalent means of unifying people 
against a common cause: sexual assault. The rise in sexual assault 
awareness campaigns has made a traditionally-taboo subject come to 
the fore of national discourse.1 It is doubtlessly true that society is now 
better off having recognized the need to make the public more keenly 
aware of the problems associated with sexual assault and harassment. 
Appallingly, it has reached the point where these problems are 
 
 J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; Bachelor of Arts, Michigan State University. I would like to thank 
Professor Hal R. Morris for his support, encouragement, advice, and instruction 
throughout the completion of this comment. I would also like to thank Eva Dickey 
and the rest of the Seventh Circuit Review editorial staff for their advice and edits as 
I moved toward the final version of this comment. 
1 See, e.g., Megan Thomas, Get the inside scoop on Sexual Assault Awareness 
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commonly referred to as “rape culture.”2 
Rape culture becomes worse still on college campuses. For 
decades, rape culture had become engrained in the college experience, 
but ignored by school authorities. Because institutions of higher 
education failed to provide adequate responses to students’ horrific 
experiences with collegiate rape culture, and have perhaps aggravated 
the effects of those experiences, politicians took the reins in finding a 
solution. As the Seventh Circuit recently recognized, the solution 
authorized—and essentially required—by the federal government has 
backfired and created a whole new set of problems for individuals 
accused of sexual misconduct. 
Colleges and universities have responded aggressively to 
sexual misconduct accusations since the U.S. Department of Education 
imposed harsh requirements upon them in 2011. But they have done so 
at great expense to another significant, yet unpopular, group of 
students—those accused of sexual misconduct. Colleges and 
universities have unreasonably harmed the accused and obstructed the 
truth-seeking purpose of sexual misconduct investigations by, for 
example, refusing to permit hearings, prohibiting their lawyers’ 
involvement in adjudicatory proceedings, and requiring the accused to 
prove his or her innocence. They have also failed to apply consistent 
standards of proof, thus causing inconsistent and arbitrary results, 
among other things. 
Yet, colleges and universities fear that if they ease these 
procedures to favor the truth-seeking process, they will lose federal 
financial aid. College students accused of sexual misconduct have 
therefore been mistreated by their beloved schools even before they 
are duly found responsible for the alleged misconduct. The common 
result in these proceedings is that the accused are often deprived of 
their education, and perhaps their future endeavors, without the 
process to which they are constitutionally and statutorily due. 
This Comment highlights the accused’s perspective of schools’ 
 
2 See Rape Culture, Marshall University Women’s Center, 
https://www.marshall.edu/wcenter/sexual-assault/rape-culture/ (last visited Dec. 2, 
2019) (explaining how “rape culture” means that society has “disregard[ed] 
women’s rights and safety,” among other things). 
2
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responses to sexual misconduct allegations. It argues, perhaps 
controversially, that courts have a duty to protect the interests of those 
students accused of sexual misconduct, and that the Seventh Circuit 
has rightly joined other courts in recognizing and enforcing this duty. 
To be clear, this Comment does not seek to undermine or otherwise 
criticize students’ allegations of sexual misconduct. Rather, this 
Comment seeks to illuminate an underappreciated perspective through 
the lens of the Seventh Circuit’s 2019 decision in Doe v. Purdue 
University, et al.3 
Part I of this Note explores the historical foundation about 
schools’ responses to sexual misconduct allegations via Title IX of the 
Education Amendments Act of 1972. Part I discusses Title IX’s 
evolution over the last several decades as well as its present 
implications. Part II introduces the Seventh Circuit’s response to a 
faulty implementation of Title IX procedures and surveys how the 
Seventh Circuit’s position compares with other courts’ early 
interpretations. Part III finally advocates that, while the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Purdue University rightly concludes that 
Purdue University deprived the male student-plaintiff of his rights, it 
did not go far enough. Specifically, Part III will discuss how the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision, together with those from other circuit 
courts of appeals, highlights the federal government’s role in 
systematically depriving male students of constitutional rights and, 




A. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 
  
1. History Leading Up to Title IX 
 
 The story behind higher education’s response to rape culture 
begins decades ago. Interestingly, that story does not even begin with 
sexual assault or harassment per se, but rather with gender 
 
3 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019). 
3
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discrimination in education4 and extra-curricular athletics.5 
  Before Congress enacted Title IX, gender discrimination in 
education and extra-curricular athletics existed beyond doubt.6 The 
problem to be addressed by Title IX was not necessarily express 
rejection of women’s rights, although that issue certainly also existed 
within the education system. The problem was instead a lack of parity 
with women’s educational, professional, and athletic opportunities, 
even where such opportunities existed in some basic form.7 
Perhaps clearer still were the discriminatory practices targeting 
women’s athletics.8 Whereas universities provided team doctors, 
insurance, and more than ample funding to men’s athletics programs, 
women’s athletics programs did not receive team doctors or insurance 
and received little, if any, funding.9 This stemmed at least in part from 
the underlying attitudes toward women’s athletics compared to men’s 
athletics.10 As the Association of American Colleges reported, 
athletics have “perpetuate[d] sex stereotypes and myths about what is 
 
4 See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of California State Universities, 198 F.3d 763, 766 
(9th Cir. 1999); Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)). 
5 See 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (daily ed. June 23, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Mink) (noting that Title IX served to increase girls’ and women’s involvement in 
athletics); Note, Emily S. Bley, Left in the Rain Without an Umbrella: How Doe v. 
Brown University Leaves Nonstudents Unsheltered by Federal Title IX Protections, 
64 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 1, 8 (2019). 
6 Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 94 (W.D. Va. 
2007) (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 5804 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bayh)); see Olivia B. 
Waxman, She Exposed the Discrimination in College Sports Before Title IX. Now 
She’s a Women’s History Month Honoree, TIME (Mar. 1, 2018), 
https://time.com/5175812/title-ix-sports-womens-history/. 
7 See 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (daily ed. June 23, 1997) (statement of Rep. 
Mink). 
8 See Waxman, supra note 6. 
9 Id. 
10 See Ass’n of Am. Colleges Report on the Project on the Status and 
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‘right’ for men and what is ‘right’ for women.”11 The attitude is that 
“[m]en are ‘supposed to be’ strong and aggressive, both physically and 
emotionally, while women are ‘supposed to be’ weak and passive.”12 
The traditional view was that “the traits associated with athletic 
excellence—achievement, self-confidence, aggressiveness, leadership, 
strength, swiftness—[were] often seen as being in ‘contradiction’ with 
the role of women.”13 These attitudes fueled “the total athletic 
opportunities that [were] available to women,” such as funding, 
adequacy of athletic facilities, and “employment conditions of their 
teachers and coaches.”14 
 Yet laws governing public institutions of higher education 
before Title IX seemed to have only perpetuated this ongoing 
discrimination by “deliberately exclud[ing women] from earlier 
antidiscrimination legislation on the grounds that educational 
institutions were autonomous entities that ought not to be subjected to 
government interference.”15 
Federal public officials thus contemplated a more precise 
resolution focusing on gender discrimination in higher education. 
 
 2. Enactment of Title IX 
 
Though many already saw the need for congressional action, 
public support for legislation curbing gender discrimination in higher 
education really began in the midst of the Civil Rights Era.16 In 1965, 






15 See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, The History, Uses, and Abuses of Title 
IX, 2016 BULLETIN OF THE AM. ASS’N OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS 69, 70 (citing 
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, tit. VIII, § 804(a)-(b), 79 Stat. 
1219, 1270 (1965) (prior to amendments)). 
16 See Iram Valentin, Title IX: A Brief History, Women’s Educational Equity 
Act (WEE) Digest (Aug. 1997), 
http://www2.edc.org/womensequity/pdffiles/t9digest.pdf. 
5
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Movement, President Johnson publicly declared “the policy of the 
Government of the United States to provide equal opportunity in 
Federal employment for all qualified persons” and “to prohibit 
discrimination in employment because of race, creed color, or national 
origin,” among other things.17 Even outside of direct federal 
employment, Executive Order 11246 prohibited all entities that 
contract with the federal government from discriminating in 
employment based on “race, creed, color, or national origin.”18 
Wholly absent from President Johnson’s directive, however, 
was the prohibition on sex discrimination.19 Recognizing this error, 
President Johnson amended the Order “to include discrimination based 
on sex.”20 From there, women’s rights activists took advantage of the 
directive and challenged employment practices based on sex.21 One 
such activist, Martha Griffiths, was a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives.22 Representative Griffiths “gave the first speech in 
the U.S. Congress concerning discrimination against women in 
education” on March 9, 1970.23 That speech ignited the passions of 
other federal public officials, resulting in “the first [federal 
government] contract compliance investigation involving sex 
discrimination.”24 
Representative Griffiths’ speech caught the attention of the 
chair of the House Special Subcommittee on Education, 
Representative Edith Green.25 The House Special Subcommittee on 
Education (hereinafter the “Subcommittee”) first attempted to prohibit 
 
17 Exec. Order No. 11246, § 101, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965) (prior to 
amendment). 
18 Id. § 202. 
19 See generally id. 
20 Valentin, supra note 16, at 2.. 
21 Id. 
22 Id.; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 70. 
23 Valentin, supra note 16, at 2. 
24 Id.; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 70. 
25 See Valentin, supra note 16, at 2; Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 
15, at 70; see also 143 Cong. Rec. H4,218 (identifying the specific subcommittee 
chaired by Representative Green). 
6
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sex discrimination “in any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance” by amending the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
originally prohibited only race, color, and national origin.26 But since 
doing so would have pegged the ban on discrimination based on sex in 
more than just education, and thus would have sparked a massive 
change in the Civil Rights Act beyond what was initially intended by 
Representatives Griffith and Green, they turned their attention to the 
Higher Education Act.27 
Title X of House Resolution 7248 therefore sought to “prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex in any educational program 
receiving Federal funds.”28 The House bill also “authorized the Civil 
Rights Commission to investigate sex discrimination,” among other 
things.29 After it was reported out of the House Education and Labor 
Committee in late September 1971, the full House made some changes 
but left the prohibition on sex discrimination intact.30 
Meanwhile, the Senate considered its own amendments to the 
Higher Education Act.31 But when the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare reported its Higher Education Act amendments to 
the full Senate, it contained no prohibitions on sex discrimination.32 
Instead, Senator Birch Bayh, during the full Senate’s floor debate in 
August 1971, proposed an amendment to the Senate bill “to ban sex 
discrimination in any public higher education institutions or graduate 
program receiving federal funds.”33 The Senate’s first attempt at 
prohibiting sex discrimination in education was halted in its tracks, 
however, when a majority of the Senators voted it down on the ground 
that Senator Bayh’s amendment was irrelevant to the rest of the bill, 
 
26 143 Cong. Rec. H4218 (statement of Rep. Mink) (discussing the history of 
Title IX to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of its enactment). 
27 Id. The Higher Education Act was codified as 20 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 See id. at 4218-19. 
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which had nothing to do with sex discrimination.34  
Senator Bayh persisted. In February 1972, when the Senate 
considered the House’s version of the Higher Education 
Amendments—which did contain language about the usage of federal 
education funds—Senator Bayh once again offered an amendment to 
ban sex discrimination at educational institutions receiving federal 
funds.35 The Senate’s final version of the Higher Education Act’s 
amendments, which contained Senator Bayh’s prohibition (with some 
exemptions added to appease some skeptical senators), passed without 
objection.36 
The final version was styled the Education Act Amendments of 
1972 and included in Title IX of the legislation a ban on “sex 
discrimination in all Federal education institutions receiving Federal 
funds, except for undergraduate admissions policies of private higher 
education institutions and public institutions of a traditional single-sex 
policy.”37 The full House and Senate each passed the Education 
Amendments Act on June 8, 1972.38 President Nixon signed it into law 
just fifteen days later.39 
Title IX has, ever since,40 contained the following 
groundbreaking language: “No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”41 
 









40 None of the subsequent legislative amendments to Title IX, codified at 20 
U.S.C. § 1681, impacted this central language. 
41 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-65). 
8
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 The initial passage of Title IX was, as seen infra Section I.A.2, 
relatively uncontroversial. But that was before people realized Title 
IX’s massive reach. Section 1 below first discusses how the executive 
and judicial branches have expanded the reach of Title IX’s language. 
Section 2 then introduces the Obama Administration’s guidance 
document that expanded Title IX too much. 
 
  1. Expansion of Title IX’s Reach 
 
After Congress enacted Title IX, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare42 took on the task of promulgating regulations 
to effect Title IX’s ban on sex discrimination in education.43 In 1975, 
that Department imposed regulations requiring the institutions subject 
to Title IX to designate a coordinator to oversee compliance with Title 
IX, post publicly the contact information for the Title IX coordinator 
as well as all relevant policies, and conduct a one-time evaluation of 
their compliance with Title IX.44 The 1975 regulations also permitted 
educational institutions to “take remedial and affirmative steps to 
increase the participation of students in programs or activities where 
[sex] bias has occurred.”45 These regulations fit well into the overall 
scheme of preventing and remedying sex discrimination at educational 
institutions. These regulations were primarily “use[d] in the early 
years of the statute . . . by female athletes demanding equal 
opportunities to participate in school athletic programs.”46 
Courts began expanding the reach of Title IX’s language in 
 
42 The executive department in charge of implementing Title IX changed to the 
Department of Education upon that Department’s creation in 1979. See generally 
Act of Oct. 17, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, §§ 201, 301, 93 Stat. 668 (1979). There is 
no indication that the Department of Education was created because of Title IX, but 
was instead created for other reasons not pertinent here. 
43 See Valentin, supra note 16, at 2. 
44 Id. at 2-3. 
45 Id. at 3. 
46 Cecily Fuhr, Causes of Action Under Title IX of Education Amendments Act 
of 1972 Against College or University for Sexual Harassment of Student by School 
Personnel or Other Student, 78 Causes of Action 2d 381, § 2 (2019). 
9
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1977 with the Connecticut federal district court’s decision in 
Alexander v. Yale University.47 The court there faced the foundational 
question of whether students had standing to bring a private cause of 
action under Title IX.48 It answered that question in the affirmative, 
thus permitting one of the plaintiffs (a female student) to proceed with 
her Title IX claim.49 At the same time Alexander implied a private 
right of action under Title IX, the Seventh Circuit refused to recognize 
such an implied right in Cannon v. University of Chicago.50 The 
United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the 
disagreement between Alexander and Cannon. In a six to three 
decision, the Supreme Court agreed with Alexander that a private right 
of action under Title IX existed.51 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Cannon therefore paved the 
way for an influx of Title IX lawsuits.52 In 1998, the Supreme Court 
held that sexual harassment by agents of a covered school could be 
remedied under Title IX where the school had “actual knowledge” and 
acted with “deliberate indifference” to its agent’s sexual harassment.53 
And the Court extended this holding just one year later, holding that 
covered schools are liable under Title IX for student-on-student sexual 
harassment pursuant to the “actual knowledge” and “deliberate 
 
47 459 F. Supp. 1 (D. Conn. 1977); see Fuhr, supra note 46, § 2 (explaining the 
historical developments of Title IX in the courts). 
48 459 F. Supp. at 2, 4. 
49 Id. at 5-7, aff’d in relevant part, 631 F.2d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 1980). 
50 See id. at 4 (citing and disagreeing with Cannon v. University of Chicago, 
559 F.2d 1063, 1082 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
51 Cannon v. Univ. of Chic., 441 U.S. 677, 709, 717 (1979). 
52 A few years after Cannon recognized an implied right of action under Title 
IX, “Congress amended Title IX to eliminate the states’ Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in Title IX action,” thus allowing causes of action against public 
universities over any objections on sovereign immunity grounds. See Fuhr, supra 
note 46, at § 2. And the Court extended the right to seek monetary damages in a Title 
IX lawsuit in 1992. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett Cty. Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 
(1992)).  
53 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292-93 (1998). 
10
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In response to the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on Title 
IX in the 1990s, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) implemented two important guides into how schools can 
prevent sexual harassment under Title IX’s dictates.55 The first, 
published in 1997, “require[ed] that schools have a grievance process 
for reporting sexual harassment and warning that schools that fail to 
respond to a hostile environment ‘permit[ ] an atmosphere of sexual 
discrimination to permeate the educational program and results in 
discrimination prohibited by Title IX.’”56 Four years later, OCR 
clarified that its guidance was intended to “‘emphasize that, in 
addressing allegations of sexual harassment, the good judgment and 
common sense of teachers and school administrators are important 
elements of a response that meets the requirements of Title IX.’”57 In 
other words, a driving purpose of the 1997 and 2001 guidance 
documents was to grant flexibility to schools to develop the policies 
and procedures that they saw fit. 
This changed in 2011. 
 
2. Dear Colleague Letter 
 
Despite the fundamental changes stemming from Title IX’s 
enactment in 1972, nothing had more impact on Title IX 
enforcement—and eventually on John Doe’s deficient sexual 
misconduct proceedings—than a seemingly innocuous letter dated 
 
54 See Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644-47 (1999). 
55 See Amy B. Cyphert, The Devil Is in the Details: Exploring Restorative 
Justice as an Option for Campus Sexual Assault Responses Under Title IX, 96 DENV. 
L. REV. 51, 57 (2018). 
56 Id. (quoting Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students By 
School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,034 
(Mar. 13, 1997)). 
57 Id. (quoting REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF 
STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, at ii-iv (Jan. 2001), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf). 
11
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April 4, 2011.58 Unfortunately for everyone—schools, victims, and the 
accused—this letter, now coined the “Dear Colleague Letter,” became 
anything but innocuous. 
In the Letter, the Department of Education’s Office for Civil 
Rights explained numerous statistics emphasizing the urgency of its 
words.59 It first identified the daunting statistics related to sexual 
violence involving students: “that about 1 in 5 women are victims of 
completed or attempted sexual assault”; about “6.1 percent of males 
were victims of completed or attempted sexual assault”; “college 
campuses reported nearly 3,300 forcible sex offenses” in 2009; “800 
reported incidents of rape and attempted rape and 3,800 reported 
incidents of other sexual batteries at public high schools”; and “the 
likelihood that a woman with intellectual disabilities will be sexually 
assaulted is estimated to be significantly higher than the general 
population.”60 
Recognizing these terrifying statistics about sexual harassment 
and sexual violence on university or college campuses, the Department 
saw the immediate need for “a call to action for the nation.”61 The 
Letter therefore served to “ensur[e] that all students feel safe in their 
school, so that they have the opportunity to benefit fully from the 
school’s programs and activities.”62 In other words, the so-called Dear 
Colleague Letter “spell[ed] out for schools exactly how they should 
undertake certain duties under Title IX” as a means of remedying, or 
at least mitigating, these problems.63 
The Dear Colleague Letter’s first task was to expand the 
definition of “sexual harassment” under the court precedents discussed 
 
58 RUSSLYNN ALI, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, POL’Y 
GUIDANCE LETTER (Apr. 4, 2011), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html 
[hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter]. 




63 See Cyphert, supra note 55, at 58. 
12
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supra Section II.B.2.64 Without any laws or court decisions to support 
its ultimate conclusion, the Letter concluded, without explanation, that 
“[s]exual harassment of students . . . includes acts of sexual 
violence.”65 This is the first sign that the Letter attempted to 
improperly develop Title IX. 
The Dear Colleague Letter also “discuss[ed] the proactive 
efforts schools can take to prevent sexual harassment and violence” 
and “provid[ed] examples of remedies that schools and OCR [the 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights] may use to end 
such conduct, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”66 The 
proactive efforts included implementing more educational programs 
related to sexual harassment and violence, increasing the amount and 
types of resources for victims, employing formal training programs for 
student and faculty employees, making materials explaining the 
applicable policies, rules, and resources easily accessible to the 
community, and improving efforts to encourage students to report 
incidents of sexual harassment and violence, among other things.67 
These proactive efforts are not the target of this Comment’s 
condemnation. 
Rather, it is the Department’s mandated remedies that have 
been cause for concern. The Dear Colleague Letter set forth the 
following significant changes, among other things: 
 
(1) [M]andated that schools use a “preponderance 
of the evidence standard” when weighing 
whether sexual harassment had occurred; 
(2) [S]trongly discourage[d] schools from allowing 
the parties personally to question or cross-
examine each other during the hearing; 
(3) [M]andated that universities conclude their 
investigations within a “reasonably prompt” 
 
64 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1, 1 n.2 
65 Id. at 1. 
66 Id. at 2. 
67 Id. at 14-15. 
13
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time frame, which the OCR suggested is 
generally under sixty days; and 
(4) [R]equired schools that allowed appeals to 
permit either party to appeal.68 
 
It is also noteworthy that the Dear Colleague Letter “forbade the use of 
mediation, even on a voluntary basis where all parties agreed, to 
resolve complaints of sexual assault brought under Title IX.”69 
The Dear Colleague Letter clarified that it sought to give only 
“significant guidance” to schools on how to approach Title IX-related 
inquiries; it apparently did not provide schools with a binding formal 
mandate.70 And yet the Letter immediately backtracked on this 
seemingly innocuous language. It clarified that, while it did not “add 
requirements to applicable law,” it “provide[d] information and 
examples to inform recipients about how OCR evaluates whether 
covered entities are complying with their legal obligations.”71 In other 
words, while OCR did not purport to establish a rule with binding 
legal effect, it did seek to strip schools of federal benefits (funding) if 
it did not comply with the Letter’s “guidance,” even if it would not 
otherwise be in violation of federal law.72 The Letter has therefore 
placed schools between a rock and a hard place; they either (1) 
disregard the Letter and risk losing the funding that they desperately 
need, or (2) succumb to what the Letter says and impose merciless 
 
68 Cyphert, supra note 55, at 58. 
69 Id. at 58-59. 
70 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1 (pointing out that the 
Letter “does not add requirements to applicable law, but provides information and 
examples to inform recipients [schools] about how OCR evaluates whether covered 
entities are complying with their legal obligations”); Cyphert, supra note 55, at 58-
59. 
71 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1. 
72 See id.; Tamara Rice Lave, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication: Why 
Universities Should Reject the Dear Colleague Letter, 64 U. Kan. L. Rev. 915, 946-
47 (2016) (explaining how institutions interpreted and responded to the Dear 
Colleague Letter). 
14
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disciplinary procedures for those accused of sexual misconduct.73 
Schools have overwhelmingly chosen the latter, perhaps 
because that kind of choice has put schools in a position where they 
must choose between the better of two undesirable options. OCR 
indeed thought about this ahead of time, for they enforced the terms of 
the Dear Colleague Letter at least in large part based on fear, not on 
any binding legal force. Professor Lave sums up this fear-based 
influence well: 
 
[I]n the [Dear Colleague Letter], OCR told academic 
institutions that if they didn’t take certain measures 
(like lowering the burden of proof) they would be found 
in violation of Title IX. In an unprecedented move, 
OCR began publishing a list of universities under 
investigation for violating Title IX, which put 
tremendous financial and social pressure on schools to 
comply with the [Dear Colleague Letter]. Even 
universities that may believe the [Dear Colleague 
Letter] is procedurally or substantively invalid are 
rolling over and complying because the cost of not 
doing so is simply too high. In essence, OCR’s actions 
have transformed what could have been a legitimate 
guidance document (if it had not had language that 
gave it the force of law) into something that is legally 
binding.74 
 
Schools have therefore imposed the procedures that the Letter requires 
notwithstanding the traditional flexibility that they historically had in 
imposing their own methods of complying with Title IX.75 
 
 
73 See Lave, supra note 72, at 947. 
74 Id. (emphasis in original). 
75 See id. at 947-48 (explaining that OCR’s previous, unchallenged guidance 
from 1997 and 2001 “give universities significant flexibility in deciding how to 
address allegations of sexual assault”). 
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3. Responses by President Trump’s Department of 
Education 
 
 On September 7, 2017, President Trump’s Secretary of 
Education, Betsy DeVos, indicated publicly that the Trump 
Administration intended to repeal and replace the Dear Colleague 
Letter.76 The Trump Administration followed through on their 
intentions later that month when they “formally rescinded” the Letter 
and replaced it with interim guidance pending a new administrative 
rule governing how schools can remain in compliance with Title IX.77 
This interim guidance purportedly “removed many of the restrictions 
in the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter placed on colleges, including the 
requirement that they use a preponderance of the evidence standard . . 
. and the suggestion that most investigations should conclude within 
sixty days.”78 
 Secretary DeVos’ words rang loud when she declared that the 
“era of rule by letter is over.”79 Though her words are gallant, they are 
not necessarily true; the devastating effects of the Dear Colleague 
Letter cannot be dispelled so easily. The unstable history of the OCR’s 
Title IX enforcement makes it difficult for colleges and universities to 
know how they can stay in compliance with Title IX.80 Because of the 
massive risks to colleges and universities, it is not unreasonable to 
think that they will be hesitant to change their policies at all in fear 
that the federal government will deprive them of the funds on which 
they so heavily rely. It is thus clear that, although the Dear Colleague 
 
76 Cyphert, supra note 55, at 61. 
77 Id. at 62. 
78 Id. 
79 Betsy DeVos, Sec’y of Educ., Remarks at George Mason Univ. (Sept. 7, 
2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/secretary-devos-prepared-remarks-title-
ix-enforcement. 
80 See Note, Michelle J. Harnik, University  Title IX Compliance: A Work In 
Progress In the Wake of Reform, 19 Nev. L.J 647, 687 (2018) (“The OCR’s failure 
to provide clear guidelines and its failure to require hearings, appeals, and a uniform 
evidentiary standard has left colleges having to decide for themselves how to handle 
such complaints and risk improperly carrying out their Title IX obligations.”). 
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Letter has been rescinded, fear of the OCR survives. 
 What is more, the Dear Colleague Letter will continue to have 
an impact for all students affected by college and university policies 
and procedures implemented from April 4, 2011, at least until 
September 7, 2017. For at least six and a half years, a letter that 
seemed so innocuous on its face rooted itself in schools’ disciplinary 
systems and wreaked havoc among students’ education and livelihood. 
Such devastation is likely to remain at least until the right compromise 
between protecting victims and protecting the accused is reached.81 
 
II. THE COURTS STEP IN 
 
With such frightening instability in how schools are supposed 
to comply with Title IX, and the devastating consequences of messing 
up, simply rescinding the Dear Colleague Letter is only the first step in 
the road to recovery. Fortunately, courts are stepping in to begin 
remedying many of the problems associated with the Dear Colleague 
Letter’s impact on schools’ policies and procedures regarding sexual 
misconduct on campus. 
Section II.A below introduces the legal framework within 
which the courts operate in Title IX litigation. Section II.B then delves 
into the Seventh Circuit’s groundbreaking decision in Doe v. Purdue 
University that recognized the Dear Colleague Letter’s harmful impact 
on male students. Section II.C discusses the Seventh Circuit’s retreat 
from precedent in Doe v. Columbia College Chicago, where it refused 
to recognize the harms inherent in the Dear Colleague Letter. Finally, 
Section II.D discusses how other circuits have addressed the concerns 
facing the Seventh Circuit in Purdue University and Columbia College 
Chicago. 
 
 A. Title IX’s Legal Framework 
 
 As noted earlier, Title IX “provides that ‘[n]o person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
 
81 See id. 
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in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.’”82 A student claiming that his or her school violated Title 
IX must therefore establish three elements: (1) that the school received 
funding from the federal government; (2) that the student “was 
excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of an educational 
program” at the school; and (3) that the school discriminated against 
the student because of his or her sex.83 Where a student has been 
disciplined after a sexual misconduct proceeding, the first two 
elements are relatively easy to satisfy.84 The third element is generally 
the determinative element.85 
 Some circuits use an intricate test using several categories of 
discrimination to determine whether a school discriminates based on 
sex.86 The Second Circuit, for example, analyzes Title IX lawsuits 
against schools using “erroneous outcome” and “selective 
enforcement” approaches.87 The “erroneous outcome” category 
requires a plaintiff-student to “show that he ‘was innocent and 
wrongly found to have committed the offense.’”88 The “selective 
enforcement” category includes proof “that ‘regardless of [his] guilt or 
innocence, the severity of the penalty and/or the decision to initiate the 
proceeding was affected by the student’s gender.’”89 The Fifth Circuit 
 
82 Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 667 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting 20 
U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-73)). 
83 See Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 2019). 
84 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667 (“It is undisputed that Purdue receives 
federal funding and that John was ‘excluded from participation in [or] denied the 
benefits of . . . [an] education program’ when Purdue suspended him.” (alterations in 
original)). 
85 See, e.g., Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 854; Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 
667. 
86 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667. 
87 Id. (citing Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709, 715 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
88 Id. (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715). 
89 Id. (quoting Yusuf, 35 F.3d at 715). 
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has adopted the Second Circuit’s two-factored approach.90 And the 
Eleventh Circuit applies the Second Circuit’s “erroneous outcome” 
approach.91 
 The Sixth Circuit uses not only the Second Circuit’s two 
categories, but also added two more categories of its own: the 
“deliberate indifference” and “archaic assumptions” tests.92 
 The Seventh Circuit, however, believed that these specific 
approaches “simply describe ways in which a plaintiff might show that 
sex was a motivating factor in a university’s decision to discipline a 
student.”93 Assuming the first two elements are satisfied, courts in the 
Seventh Circuit ask one simple question to determine whether a 
student has stated a valid Title IX discrimination claim: Do the facts, 
taken as true, “‘raise a plausible inference that the university 
discriminated’” against the student because of his or her sex?94 
 
 B. The Seventh Circuit Speaks: Doe v. Purdue University 
 
  1. Facts95 
 
The plaintiff, fictitiously named John Doe, was a student at 
Purdue University enrolled as a member of the Navy Reserve Officers’ 
Training Corps (ROTC). Other than the disciplinary proceedings 
discussed below, John had an “unblemished disciplinary record.”96 
Jane Doe was also a student at Purdue University and was a Navy 
 
90 Id. (citing Plummer v. Univ. of Hous., 860 F.3d 767, 777-78 (5th Cir. 
2017)). 
91 Id. (quoting Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th Cir. 2018)). 
92 Id. (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018)). 
93 Id. 
94 Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855 (quoting Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 
667-68). 
95 Unless otherwise noted, facts stated in this subsection are taken from the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 656-58 (7th Cir. 
2019). 
96 Brief of Appellant at 3, Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 17-3565 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 
2018). 
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Purdue University was, and still is, “a land grant university 
established by the State of Indiana with a main campus in West 
Lafayette, Indiana and is audited by the State of Indiana, the 
beneficiary of state authorized bonds and recipient of state and federal 
grants.”97 
John and Jane’s story was, at first, a happy one—they were 
romantically involved during the fall of 2015. Between October and 
December 2015, John and Jane engaged in consensual sexual 
intercourse about fifteen to twenty times. There was never any dispute 
that, throughout this three-month period of time, all of the instances of 
sexual intercourse between John and Jane were consensual. 
Over the course of the fall 2015 semester, however, their 
relationship eroded. Suffering from depression, Jane talked with John 
about her feelings of hopelessness and expressed to him that she hated 
her life and wanted to run away. Jane’s behavior became “increasingly 
erratic.” Her depression culminated in a suicide attempt which 
occurred immediately in front of John on December 13, 2015. Though 
they continued dating after Jane’s suicide attempt, John and Jane’s 
sexual relationship ended. Neither Jane nor John informed anyone 
else, apparently including emergency medical personnel, about Jane’s 
suicide attempt. 
Whatever remaining romantic relations terminated, however, 
when John reported Jane’s suicide attempt to two university resident 
assistants and an advisor. Jane thereafter broke off all relations with 
John and distanced herself from him. Throughout all of this, Jane 
made no reports to Purdue, the police, or any other third party about 
any alleged sexual misconduct by John.98 Nor did Jane make any 
reports of sexual misconduct by John to anyone through March 2016. 
April 2016 was, however, Sexual Assault Awareness Month. 
To spread awareness, organizations such as the Center for Advocacy, 
Response, and Education (CARE), a center at Purdue “dedicated to 
supporting victims of sexual violence,” hosted events across Purdue’s 
 
97 Id. at 3-4. 
98 Id. at 4. 
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campus that encouraged students to report sexual assaults. CARE 
achieved its praiseworthy goal within just the first few days of April: 
five students reported sexual misconduct to Purdue. 
Jane was one of those five students. Jane reported to Purdue 
officials that she woke up to John “groping her over her clothes 
without her consent” while she was sleeping in his room. Jane, 
according to her initial report, declined John’s sexual advances only to 
find out that John “confessed that he had digitally penetrated her while 
the two were sleeping in Jane’s room earlier that month.” She also 
complained of additional acts of misconduct, such as sifting through 
her underwear drawer, chasing her around while joking that he would 
taser her, entering her room without permission after they broke up, 
and becoming angry in front of her. 
Soon after her report, Purdue’s Dean of Students and Title IX 
coordinator, Katherine Sermersheim, reached out to John by letter to 
inform him that Purdue had initiated a formal investigation into Jane’s 
allegations of sexual misconduct. Upon receipt of Sermersheim’s 
letter, “John was suspended from the Navy ROTC, banned from all 
buildings where Jane had classes, and barred from eating in his usual 
dining hall because Jane also used it.” Although Jane had not filed a 
formal complaint, Purdue decided to investigate anyway, perhaps 
because the Dear Colleague Letter obliged schools to investigate any 
instances of sexual harassment or violence regardless of whether they 
are asked to do so by complaining witnesses.99 
John thereafter denied in writing every one of Jane’s 
allegations of misconduct. John admitted, however, that he once 
“touched Jane’s knee while she was sleeping on a futon and he was on 
the floor next to her” after her suicide attempt. Other than that, John 
unequivocally denied all of Jane’s allegations of sexual misconduct, 
including her allegation that he groped her and engaged in other 
inappropriate sexual and nonsexual behavior. 
In addition to outright denying sexual misconduct, John 
provided circumstantial evidence of his innocence. He informed 
Sermersheim that Jane continued to talk with John over the winter 
 
99 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 4. 
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holidays and invited him to her room on campus when school resumed 
that following January. John also produced evidence to Sermersheim 
indicating that Jane was emotionally “troubled” and “unstable.” And 
when John and his “supporter” (someone who could accompany John 
to any meetings) met with investigators, he continued to deny the 
allegations, provided evidence that he believed showed his innocence, 
including “friendly” text messages between Jane and him, as well as 
the names of more than thirty people who could and would “speak to 
his integrity.” 
Pursuant to Purdue’s Title IX policies, Sermersheim submitted 
a completed “investigators’ report” to a three-person panel assembled 
by Purdue’s Advisory Committee on Equity. The Committee’s 
ultimate purpose was to review Sermersheim’s report, listen to the 
parties’ accounts of what happened, and then make a recommendation 
to Sermersheim on guilt or innocence and any recommended 
sanctions. 
John’s hearing with the Committee panel was, however, 
lackluster at best. Although John appeared at the hearing to defend 
himself, he was neither given a copy of Sermersheim’s report nor 
allowed to review it. John became aware of Sermersheim’s findings 
only because a Navy ROTC representative gave him a redacted copy 
to review for a few minutes. From this cursory review of the factual 
findings, John learned that the investigators “falsely claimed that he 
had confessed to Jane’s allegations” and “failed to include John’s 
description of Jane’s suicide attempt.”  
John and his supporter attended the hearing and met with the 
Committee members for about thirty minutes. Because Jane did not 
appear at the hearing, CARE’s director wrote a letter on behalf of the 
allegations against John summarizing the accusations. To John’s 
amazement, he had read more of the investigators’ report in his 
cursory review than two of the three panelists; those two panelists 
“candidly stated that they had not read the investigative report.” And 
the third panelist apparently assumed John’s guilt. John was not 
allowed to see or address the evidence at the hearing. He was also not 
allowed to present any witnesses, “including character witnesses and a 
roommate who would state that he was present in the room at the time 
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of the alleged assault and that Jane’s rendition of events was false.” 
About one week after the hearing, Sermersheim informed John 
in “a perfunctory letter” that she found him guilty of sexual violence 
and therefore suspended him from Purdue for an academic year. 
Because Sermersheim failed to detail any factual basis for her 
determination, John briefly won an appeal to Purdue’s Vice President 
for Ethics and Compliance, Alysa Rollock. But Sermersheim quickly 
responded with the following “detailed” factual findings: 
 
1. [Jane Doe] had fallen asleep on a futon with you on 
the floor beside her. She woke up and found that you 
inappropriately touched her over her clothing and 
without her consent by placing your hand above her 
knee, between her legs, and moved it up to her “crotch” 
areas; and 
 
2. On another occasion, while she was sleeping and 
without her consent, you inappropriately touched [Jane 
Doe] by digitally penetrating her vagina. 
 
Sermersheim identified the basis for these factual findings in a 
similarly perfunctory fashion: “I find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that [John Doe] is not a credible witness. I find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [Jane Doe] is a credible witness.” 
 This time, however, Rollock upheld Sermersheim’s factual 
findings, determination of guilt, and imposed sanction. John was 
thereafter forced to resign from the Navy ROTC because of its zero-
tolerance sexual harassment policy. 
 
 2. Procedural History 
 
John sued various agents of Purdue University, including 
Sermersheim, Rollock, and the investigators, for violating the 
Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that they deprived him of his liberty 
23
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and property without due process of law.100 On the Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, he separately sought monetary relief and 
injunctive relief.101 He also sued Purdue University for violating Title 
IX by discriminating against him because he was a male.102 
A federal magistrate judge dismissed all three claims with 
prejudice.103 The magistrate judge dismissed John’s § 1983 claim 
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment because “the disciplinary 
proceedings did not deprive John of either liberty or property, so the 
Due Process Clause did not apply.”104 The magistrate dismissed John’s 
claim for injunctive relief for lacking standing since there was no 
evidence of future harm.105 The magistrate judge also dismissed John’s 
Title IX claim because he could not show enough evidence of 
discrimination on the basis of sex.106 
John appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, where he challenged the dismissal of all three claims for 
relief.107 
 
  3. John Doe’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim 
 
 John first alleged that “he was punished pursuant to a process 
that failed to satisfy the minimum standards of fairness required by the 
Due Process Clause.108 He claimed that Purdue’s procedures failed due 
process scrutiny in eight ways: (1) “he was not provided with the 
investigative report or any of the evidence on which the 
decisionmakers relied in determining his guilt and punishment”; (2) 
 
100 See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2019). 
101 Id. at 658 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 
(1908), respectively). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 658-59. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 659. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
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“Jane did not appear before the Advisory Committee”; (3) John “had 
no opportunity to cross-examine Jane”; (4) “Sermersheim found Jane 
credible even though neither Sermersheim nor the Advisory 
Committee talked to her in person”; (5) “Jane did not write her own 
statement for the panel, much less a sworn one”; (6) “Sermersheim 
was in charge of both the investigation and the adjudication of his 
case”; (7) “the Advisory Committee was blatantly biased against him”; 
and (8) “the Advisory Committee refused to allow him to present any 
evidence, including witnesses.”109 
 The court first noted that Seventh Circuit precedent holds that 
“due process claims in the context of university discipline has focused 
on whether a student has a protected property interest in his education 
at a state university.”110 But precedent also holds that education, 
without more, does not constitute a property interest under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.111 Rather, courts in the Seventh Circuit “‘ask 
whether the student has shown that he has a legally protected 
entitlement to his continued education at the university.’”112 
 The first way John could assert a constitutionally-protected 
property interest in his education is by claiming a valid contractual 
entitlement.113 The court quickly rejected John’s claim of such a 
contractual entitlement because his claim rested on an Indiana state 
court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects students from 
expulsion or suspension without due process of law, a generalized 
property interest that the Seventh Circuit has squarely rejected.114 
 The court nevertheless allowed John to proceed on his 
Fourteenth Amendment claim because he stated a constitutionally-





112 Id. (quoting Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill. at Chic., 741 F.2d 769, 
773 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)). 
113 See id. at 660. 
114 Id. (citing Williams v. Wendler, 530 F.3d 584, 589 (7th Cir. 2008)) 
(rejecting John Doe’s reliance on Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1996)). 
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service.115 Under Seventh Circuit precedent, John had to satisfy the 
“‘stigma plus’ test, which require[d] him to show that the state 
inflicted reputational damage accompanied by an alteration in legal 
status that deprived him of a right he previously held.”116 This test 
requires more than simply having to tell future employers about a 
guilty finding from Purdue to maintain a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim.117 
 Writing for the unanimous panel, Judge Barrett concluded that 
John satisfied the stigma plus test because Purdue’s guilty finding 
came with a legal obligation to disclose it to the Navy.118 Ordinarily, 
disclosure of a guilty finding is voluntary and therefore does not by 
itself tarnish the reputation so as to violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
stigma plus test.119 But John alleged more; he alleged that the state 
forced Purdue’s hand—and necessarily harmed John’s future—
because the law required John to allow Purdue to disclose his guilty 
finding to the navy.120 
 John also adequately met the second part of the stigma plus 
test: a change in John’s legal status.121 Once Purdue formally 
adjudicated John’s guilt, “he went from a full-time student in good 
standing to one suspended for an academic year.”122 The “official 
determination of guilt . . . deprived John of occupational liberty” by 
“caus[ing] his expulsion from the Navy ROTC program (with the 
accompanying loss of scholarship) and foreclosed the possibility of his 
 
115 See id. at 661-63. 
116 See id. at 661. 
117 See id. at 662. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. at 661-62 (citing Olivieri v. Rodriguez, 122 F.3d 406, 408-09 (7th 
Cir. 1997)) (explaining that “a plaintiff who publicizes negative information about 
himself cannot establish that the defendant deprived him of a liberty interest,” and 
that it is often “uncertain whether [a plaintiff’s] prospective employers would ever 
find out” the reasons for a discharge or expulsion). 
120 Id. at 662. 
121 Id. at 662-63. 
122 Id. at 662 (citing analogous Seventh Circuit cases). 
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re-enrollment in it.”123 John therefore satisfied the stigma plus test, 
thus allowing the court to delve into the adequacy of Purdue’s 
procedures that led to the guilty finding.124 
 The test for Fourteenth Amendment-compliant procedures is 
fundamental fairness, which “is always a context-specific inquiry.”125 
Schools have ample authority to implement procedures and 
penalties.126 Many factors, such as “the severity of the consequence 
and the level of education,” inform the schools’ choice to impose 
particular procedures and penalties.127 Notably, the Supreme Court has 
held that “[a] 10-day suspension warrants fewer procedural safeguards 
than a longer one.”128 
 Given this framework, John’s Seventh Circuit panel agreed 
with John.129 Reasoning that John “was suspended by a university 
rather than a high school, for sexual violence rather than academic 
failure, and for an academic year rather than a few days,” the court 
concluded that “John’s circumstances entitled him to relatively formal 
procedures.”130 Yet Purdue did not disclose evidence to John and 
withheld relevant evidence in adjudicating his guilt, which is “itself 
sufficient to render the process fundamentally unfair.”131 What is 
more, the court had even more reason to believe that Purdue’s 
procedures were fundamentally unfair because John’s hearing acted as 
a “‘sham or pretense.’”132 For example, the panelists at John’s hearing 
admitted their failure to read the investigative report prior to the 
hearing; the investigator favored Jane’s credibility over John’s 
 
123 Id. at 662-63. 
124 See id. at 663. 
125 Id. (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)). 
126 See id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 584). 
129 See id. at 663-64. 
130 Id. at 663. 
131 Id. (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 580). 
132 Id. (quoting Dietchweiler by Dietchweiler v. Lucas, 827 F.3d 622, 629 (7th 
Cir. 2016)). 
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credibility while never having had occasion to evaluate Jane’s 
credibility; and Purdue’s agents refused to consider exculpatory 
evidence justifying clearing John of the allegations against him.133 
 These procedures—or lack thereof—together with the 
significant loss of liberty at stake, provided the court with plenty of 
reason to permit John’s Fourteenth Amendment claim to proceed.134 
 
  4. John Doe’s Title IX Claim 
 
 John also claimed that Purdue violated Title IX by 
discriminating against him in the sexual misconduct proceedings 
because he is male.135 Though the court recognized that other circuits 
employ different tests to determine whether a school violates Title IX, 
it decided that the question is quite obvious: “do the alleged facts, if 
true, raise a plausible inference that the university discriminated 
against John ‘on the basis of sex.’”136 The tests employed by other 
circuits, according to the court, “simply describe ways in which a 
plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating factor in a university’s 
decision to discipline a student.”137 Therefore, John could establish a 
Title IX violation via many avenues, including, but not necessarily 
limited to, showing that he was innocent, that a severe penalty or 
decision was imposed because he was male, that Purdue was 
deliberately indifferent to the faulty proceedings that harmed John, or 
that Purdue used archaic assumptions in imposing misconduct 
procedures, in their finding of guilt, or in their choice of sanction.138 
 In large part, John blamed the Dear Colleague Letter for 
 
133 See id. at 663-64. 
134 See generally id. After finding that John stated a valid Fourteenth 
Amendment claim, and before it discussed John’s Title IX claim, the court discussed 
the type of remedies properly available to John moving forward in the litigation. See 
id. at 664-67. This discussion is not pertinent to this Comment’s analysis and is 
therefore left out. 
135 See id. at 667. 
136 Id. at 667-68. 
137 Id. at 667. 
138 See id. 
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Purdue’s mistreatment of him in his sexual misconduct proceedings.139 
The Seventh Circuit panel summarized John’s claim as follows: 
 
According to John, this letter reveals that Purdue had a 
financial motive for discriminating against males in 
sexual assault investigations. To protect its federal 
funds, John says, the university tilted the process 
against men accused of sexual assault so that it could 
elevate the number of punishments imposed. The 
resulting track record of enforcement would permit 
Purdue to signal its commitment to cracking down on 
campus sexual assault, thereby fending off any 
suggestion that it was not complying with the 
Department of Education’s directive. And because the 
Office of Civil Rights . . . had opened two 
investigations into Purdue during 2016, the pressure on 
the university to demonstrate compliance was far from 
abstract. That pressure may have been particularly 
acute for Sermersheim, who, as a Title IX coordinator, 
bore some responsibility for Purdue’s compliance.140 
 
To determine Purdue’s liability under Title IX, the court first 
discussed whether, and to what extent, John’s reliance on the Dear 
Colleague Letter was justified.141 Noting that “[o]ther circuits have 
treated the Dear Colleague letter as relevant in evaluating the 
plausibility of a Title IX claim,” the Seventh Circuit followed suit.142 
The court adopted the perspectives of the Second and Sixth Circuits, 
both of which recognize the relevance of the Dear Colleague Letter’s 
 
139 See id. at 668 (“John casts his Title IX claim against the backdrop of a 2011 
‘Dear Colleague’ Letter from the U.S. Department of Education to colleges and 
universities.”). 
140 Id. (citation omitted). 
141 See id. at 668-69. 
142 See id. (citing Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 594 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe 
v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58 
(2d Cir. 2016)). 
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inherent pressures on schools to impose aggressive reforms.143 
 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit now recognizes that 
“‘pressure from the government to combat vigorously sexual assault 
on college campuses and the severe potential punishment—loss of all 
federal funds—if [schools] fail[ ] to comply,’” together with other 
factual allegations, supports “‘a reasonable inference of gender 
discrimination.’”144 As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the pressure from a 
government “investigation and the resulting negative publicity 
‘provides a backdrop, that, when combined with other circumstantial 
evidence of bias in Doe’s specific proceeding, gives rise to a plausible 
claim.’”145 Put differently, the Seventh Circuit now holds that it is 
sufficiently plausible to withstand a motion to dismiss to suggest an 
“‘inference that the panel adopted a biased stance in favor of the 
accusing female and against the defending male . . .  to avoid further 
fanning the criticisms that [the school] turned a blind eye to [sexual] 
assaults.’”146 
 The extent to which the Dear Colleague Letter and its 
corresponding financial incentive actually impacts the outcome of a 
motion to dismiss, however, rests on the adequacy of additional factual 
allegations in the complaint.147 In other words, the Dear Colleague 
Letter cannot establish a Title IX claim alone, but merely “gives John 
a story about why Purdue might have been motivated to discriminate 
against males accused of sexual assault.”148 Following the court of 
appeals cases that came before it, the court in Purdue University 
ultimately recognized that, for John to state a claim of Title IX 
discrimination, “he must allege facts raising the inference that Purdue 
acted at least partly on the basis of sex in his particular case.”149 
 
143 See id. (citing Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; Baum, 903 F.3d at 586; 
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58). 
144 Id. at 668 (quoting Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594). 
145 Id. at 668-69 (quoting Baum, 903 F.3d at 586). 
146 Id. at 669 (quoting Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58). 
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 The egregious facts concerning John’s disciplinary proceedings 
made this case an easy one for the unanimous panel. Pairing Purdue’s 
intolerably unfair prosecution of John with the reasons for doing so, as 
easily inferred by the Dear Colleague Letter, Purdue University held 
that “John’s allegations raise[d] a plausible inference that he was 
denied an educational benefit on the basis of his sex.”150 
 The court concluded by explaining how the standard to survive 
a motion to dismiss assists John’s arguments: “To be sure, John may 
face problems of proof, and the factfinder might not buy the inferences 
that he’s selling. But his claim should have made it past the pleading 
stage, so we reverse the magistrate judge’s premature dismissal of 
it.”151 In so stating, the court effectively told future panels that the 
pressure placed on schools, coupled with schools’ implementation of 
the Dear Colleague Letter’s requirements, as seen in the disciplinary 
process enforced against male students, is enough to state a claim of 
sex discrimination under Title IX.152 
 
C. The Seventh Circuit Retreats: Doe v. Columbia College 
Chicago 
 
 Purdue University brought the Seventh Circuit’s Title IX 
jurisprudence full-circle and properly recognized the federal 
government’s failures toward the accused. Less than two months later, 
however, a panel of the Seventh Circuit retreated from the progress 
made in recognizing the rights of the accused in Doe v. Columbia 
College Chicago.153 
 In Columbia College Chicago, Jane Roe and John Doe II154 
 
150 See id. at 669-70. 
151 Id. at 670. 
152 See id. at 668-70. 
153 933 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2019). 
154 In the lawsuit against Columbia College, the plaintiff is styled as “John 
Doe.” This Comment, however, refers to Columbia College Chicago’s John Doe as 
“John Doe II” to distinguish him from the John Doe in Purdue University. 
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engaged in a sexual encounter in December 2015.155 About two 
months later, Roe filed a Title IX complaint with Columbia College 
alleging that she did not consent to sexual activity with Doe II.156 
Unlike in Purdue University, Columbia College here provided Doe II 
with at least some process.157 Doe II was given a chance to present his 
own evidence, and was specifically asked to provide exculpatory 
evidence; the Title IX coordinator allowed the investigation to 
continue after first deciding that “there was sufficient evidence for a 
reasonable hearing panel to conclude that Doe [II] had violated the 
school’s sexual misconduct policy”; and Doe II was given a chance to 
review the investigation materials before the hearing.158 Doe II was 
also expressly permitted to bring his attorney with him to any 
meetings with investigators; university administrators met with Doe II 
to address his specific concerns about the proceedings; Columbia 
College properly addressed Doe II’s complaints of retaliation by Roe’s 
friends; investigators sent Doe II letters specifying the allegations 
against him and repeatedly requesting evidence or witnesses on his 
behalf; and Columbia College provided Doe II “with an academic 
advisor who could approve any accommodations [he] might need.159 
Columbia College’s investigators also provided Doe II with the 
evidence supplied by Roe during the investigation and permitted Doe 
II to respond in writing to that evidence and ensured that every piece 
of evidence presented by both Roe and Doe II was presented to the 
panelists at Doe II’s hearing.160 
 The hearing panel ultimately concluded that Doe II was 
responsible for violating Columbia College’s sexual misconduct 
policy, but not responsible for Roe’s other two claims of 
misconduct.161 And when Doe II appealed this decision, Columbia 
 
155 Id. at 852. 
156 Id. 
157 See id. at 852-54. 
158 Id. at 852. 
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College granted Doe II’s request to substitute the appeals officer 
because the officer had been involved with a documentary that 
appeared to favor sexual assault survivors over the rights of the 
accused.162 The new appeals officer, about whom Doe II had no 
objections, affirmed the hearing panel’s factual findings and sanction, 
which recommended that Doe II be suspended for one academic 
year.163 
 Doe II filed the underlying lawsuit against Columbia College 
alleging Title IX violations, among other allegations.164 Just as in 
Purdue University, Doe II alleged discrimination based on sex because 
the Dear Colleague Letter, “pressure from the Office of Civil Right 
investigations, and the aforementioned on-campus programming 
combined to cause Columbia College to implement anti-male policies 
to increase convictions of male students.”165 Although Doe II made 
similar, if not identical, claims under Title IX as did John Doe in 
Purdue University, his claims were not taken as seriously as they 
deserved.166 
 Judge Bauer, writing for the unanimous panel in Columbia 
College Chicago, significantly undermined the treatment given to the 
Dear Colleague Letter in Purdue University—its mandatory precedent 
decided less than two months earlier.167 Judge Bauer’s linguistic 
selections are telling: 
 
To address [the problem of high percentages of sexual 
assaults on college campuses], the [Dear Colleague 
Letter] encouraged schools to publish their 
discrimination policies, adopt and publish grievance 
 
162 See id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 853-54. Doe II did not claim Fourteenth Amendment violations, 
unlike in Purdue University, perhaps because the procedures at issue in Columbia 
College Chicago likely satisfied constitutional minimums. 
165 Id. at 855. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
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procedures, ensure their employees are trained to report 
and effectively respond to incidents of harassment, and 
appoint a Title IX coordinator. The letter also 
encouraged schools to apply a preponderance of the 
evidence standard when adjudicating sexual assault 
cases.168 
 
Contrast this language from that used in Purdue University less than 
two months earlier: 
 
[The Dear Colleague Letter] ushered in a more rigorous 
approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations by, 
among other things, defining “sexual harassment” more 
broadly than in comparable contexts, mandating that 
schools prioritize the investigation and resolution of 
harassment claims, and requiring them to adopt a 
lenient “more likely than not” burden of proof when 
adjudicating claims against alleged perpetrators. The 
Department of Education made clear that it took the 
letter and its enforcement very seriously. And it 
warned schools that “[t]his Administration is 
committed to using all its tools to ensure that all 
schools comply with [T]itle IX so campuses will be 
safer for students across the country.” In other words, a 
school’s federal funding was at risk if it could not show 
that it was vigorously investigating and punishing 
sexual misconduct.169 
 
 Columbia College Chicago rightly explains that the Dear 
Colleague Letter, without more, is insufficient to permit Doe II to 
 
168 Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). 
169 Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) 
(second and third alterations in original) (internal citations omitted). 
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withstand a motion to dismiss.170 But the court failed to address in its 
opinion pertinent facts that demonstrate reasons to believe that the 
Dear Colleague Letter was accompanied by Columbia College’s 
discrimination specifically based on Doe II’s sex—facts that the 
district court acknowledged: 
 
• A toxicology report found “that Roe falsely alleged 
her self-induced alcohol consumption caused her to 
fade ‘in and out of consciousness’ when interacting 
with Doe”; 
• Affidavits from three students “indicated that Roe 
did not manifest signs of incapacitation the night of 
the incident”; 
• The hearing panel “concluded that Roe falsely 
alleged that Doe held her down and forced her to 
engage in non-consensual kissing”; 
• “A polygraph expert confirmed that Doe honestly 
testified that he did not force Roe to perform oral 
sex on him, Roe did not push his head away when 
he performed oral sex on her, and Roe did not 
appear to Doe to be under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs”; 
• “Roe sent Doe a text message the morning after the 
incident saying she had a ‘great time’ with Doe”; 
and 
• “Roe admitted to the Hearing Panel that her 
responses to Doe were ‘unclear or very passive’ 
despite previously claiming that she made repeated 
 
170 See Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855; see also Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 
at 669 (“[T]he letter, standing alone, is obviously not enough to get John over the 
plausibility line.”); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018) (clarifying that 
the Dear Colleague Letter “alone is not enough to state a claim that the university 
acted with bias in this particular case”). 
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requests for the sexual interaction to stop.”171 
 
Rather than delving into why the panel thought none of these facts 
were sufficient, it ignored all but one and simply concluded—without 
meaningful explanation—that it was plausible for the hearing board to 
determine that Roe did not consent to sexual activity with Doe II.172 
The court focused not on the ways in which the facts as pled were 
insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, but instead on the ways in 
which Columbia College defended against Doe II’s Title IX claim.173 
But this does not answer the question posed by a Title IX 
discrimination lawsuit, which asks instead whether it is plausible that 
Columbia College Chicago imposed a process that was biased against 
Doe II because he was a male student.174 And it deviates from the 
well-settled principles that the allegations in the pleadings are to be 
accepted as true and judged on the reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.175 
 The panel also mischaracterized the requirement that 
allegations involving the financial incentive and publicity concerns 
addressed in the Dear Colleague Letter be coupled “with facts 
particular to [the] case.”176 It therefore deviated from the precedent set 
in Purdue University. The facts supporting the plaintiff in Purdue 
University may have been more egregious than those in Columbia 
College Chicago, but the decision whether to permit the plaintiffs to 
proceed to discovery on their Title IX claims does not rest on identical 
fact patterns. Rather, all that needs to be shown under Purdue 
University is pressure inflicted by the Dear Colleague Letter coupled 
 
171 Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 299 F. Supp. 3d 939, 944, 954-55 (N.D. Ill. 
2017). 
172 See Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 856 (explaining how a toxicology 
report that Doe II used to prove that Roe was not incapacitated, and therefore could 
have consented, was inconclusive). 
173 See id. (explaining the ways in which Doe II was provided procedures to his 
benefit, not the sufficiency or insufficiency of Doe II’s allegations). 
174 See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 667-68. 
175 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 
176 Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d at 855. 
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with facts tending to show bias against male students.177 
 
 D. Other Circuits’ Case Law 
 
 With its decision in Purdue University, the Seventh Circuit 
joined at least two other circuits that have held the federal government 
indirectly accountable for its undue influence on schools in sexual 
misconduct disciplinary policies and procedures.178 
The Sixth Circuit, for example, has become a leading circuit on 
this issue. In Doe v. Miami University, the Sixth Circuit’s first of two 
oft-cited opinions on this issue, a male student was suspended from 
school for eight months, although the student’s successful appeal 
caused his suspension to be reduced to four months.179 In addition to 
some facts tending to show bias against the male student in the 
disciplinary process,180 the court in Miami University again recognized 
the importance of the external pressures placed on the university by 
not only the public, but also the federal government.181 Explaining that 
statistical evidence showed a pattern in favor of female accusers and 
against accused male students in recent years, the court agreed that 
such a pattern could have been caused by “external pressure from the 
federal government and lawsuits brought by private parties.”182 
Agreeing with the plaintiff-student’s argument, the court clarified that 
the Dear Colleague Letter could have played a large role in this pattern 
of discrimination: “[P]ressure from the government to combat 
vigorously sexual assault on college campuses and the severe potential 
punishment—loss of all federal funds—if it failed to comply, led 
Miami University to discriminate against men in its sexual-assault 
 
177 Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668-69. 
178 See, e.g., Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575,  (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Miami 
Univ., 882 F.3d 579,  (6th Cir. 2018); Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46, 58 n.11 
(2d Cir. 2016). 
179 882 F.3d 579, 584 (6th Cir. 2018). 
180 See id. at 592-93. 
181 See id. at 593-94. 
182 See id. 
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adjudication process.”183 On these facts, and notwithstanding whether 
other plausible explanations existed for Miami University’s 
adjudication of male students, the male student’s Title IX 
discrimination claim survived dismissal.184 
In Doe v. Baum, the Sixth Circuit’s second well-known Title 
IX case, a male student brought a Title IX lawsuit after the student 
voluntarily withdrew from the University of Michigan in lieu of 
expulsion.185 About two years before the student’s disciplinary 
proceedings, the University of Michigan came under fire from the 
federal government for its failures in responding to sexual misconduct 
allegations.186 That investigation led to public outcry against the 
University, which lasted at least through the plaintiff-student’s 
disciplinary proceedings.187 As in Purdue University, the Sixth Circuit 
recognized that the “public attention and the ongoing investigation put 
pressure on the university to prove that it took complaints of sexual 
misconduct seriously.”188 It also “stood to lose millions in federal aid 
if the Department found it non-compliant with Title IX” and “knew 
that a female student had triggered the federal investigation and that 
the news media consistently highlighted the university’s poor response 
to female complaints.”189 
 Also like in Purdue University and its progeny, Baum noted 
there must be more than simply pressure on the university to be biased 
against male students; there must also be some evidence that they 
acted on that pressure.190 Evidence that raised a “plausible claim” 
included the fact that the University favored statements from the 
victim and her witnesses while discrediting the accused’s statement 
 
183 See id. at 594 (citing Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58). 
184 Id. 
185 See Baum, 903 F.3d at 578, 580. 
186 Id. at 586. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (emphasis added); cf. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 
2019). 
189 Baum, 903 F.3d at 586. 
190 See id. 
38
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 4
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/4
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
and statements from his witnesses.191 Baum concluded that at least 
“one plausible explanation is that the Board discredited all males . . . 
and credited all females . . . because of gender bias.”192 All that was 
needed to allow the male student’s claim to proceed was a 
combination of “specific allegation[s] of adjudicator bias” and 
“external pressure facing the university.”193 
 The Second Circuit took a similar approach. In Doe v. 
Columbia University, the university suspended the male student for 
one and one half years for violating its sexual misconduct policy.194 
The male student sued under Title IX and the Second Circuit quickly 
agreed that his lawsuit could proceed.195 The court reasoned that the 
hearing panel, dean, and Title IX investigator “were all motivated . . .  
by pro-female, anti-male bias” in order “to refute criticisms circulating 
in the student body and in the public press that Columbia was turning 
a blind eye to female students’ charges of sexual assaults by male 
students.”196 The university, in other words, was “motivated to favor 
the accusing female over the accused male, so as to protect themselves 
and the University from accusations that they had failed to protect 
female students from sexual assault.”197 The plaintiff-student alleged 
specific facts that the University incorrectly weighed evidence to favor 
the female complainant and changed its policies and procedures in the 
wake of mounting public pressures from those that were originally 
intended to protect the accused.198 He also alleged, as in Purdue 
University, that “the investigator and the [hearing] panel declined to 
seek out potential witnesses Plaintiff had identified as sources of 




193 See id. 
194 831 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 2016). 
195 See id. at 56. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 57. 
198 See id. at 56-57 
199 See id. at 56; cf. Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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“substantial criticism” and mounting pressure for the university to 
prove its compliance with Title IX gave plenty of plausible reasons to 
maintain the male student’s Title IX claim.200 
 Columbia University went even further toward recognizing the 
true harms caused by financial implications of the federal 
government’s determination that the school is noncompliant with Title 
IX, albeit in a footnote: 
 
[T]he possible motivations mentioned by the district 
court as more plausible than sex discrimination, 
including a fear of negative publicity or of Title IX 
liability, are not necessarily . . . lawful motivations 
distinct from sex bias. A defendant is not excused from 
liability for discrimination because the discriminatory 
motivation does not result from a discriminatory heart, 
but rather from a desire to avoid practical 
disadvantages that might result from unbiased action. 
A covered university that adopts, even temporarily, a 
policy of bias favoring one sex over the other in a 
disciplinary dispute, doing so in order to avoid liability 
or bad publicity, has practiced sex discrimination, 
notwithstanding that the motive for the discrimination 
did not come from ingrained or permanent bias against 
that particular sex.201 
 
With this, the Second Circuit confirmed the significance of the Dear 
Colleague Letter and the corresponding financial duress placed on 
hundreds, if not thousands, of colleges and universities. 
 Decisions holding the federal government responsible for years 
of discrimination against male students is growing beyond these few 
circuits.202 Because courts are now acknowledging the circular 
 
200 See Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 57-58. 
201 See id. at 58 n.11. 
202 See, e.g., Doe v. Amherst Coll., 238 F. Supp. 3d 195, 204-05, 222-23 (D. 
Mass. 2017) (providing the Dear Colleague as the backdrop for the college’s sexual 
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consequences of taking Title IX enforcement too far, it will not be 
surprising to see more courts, and perhaps the U.S. Supreme Court, 
join the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.   
 
III. DOE v. PURDUE UNIVERSITY PROPERLY RECOGNIZES 
THE SYSTEMATIC PROBLEMS WITH TITLE IX 
ENFORCEMENT, BUT SHOULD HAVE GONE FURTHER. 
 
Courts have clearly become more receptive to male students’ 
Title IX discrimination claims.203 Yet, as Columbia College Chicago 
shows, courts inconsistently apply the standards that permit the Dear 
Colleague Letter and financial duress as sufficient to establish sex 
discrimination under Title IX.204 In Purdue University, however, the 
Seventh Circuit had before it a perfect set of facts to hold the federal 
government accountable for its role in discriminatorily punishing male 
students.205 It could—and indeed should—have gone further. 
The court first should have discussed how the facts pled by 
John Doe plausibly established a systematic attempt to discriminate 
 
misconduct disciplinary process against a male student, and denying a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings in relevant part); Doe v. Lynn Univ., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 
3d 1336, 1339-43 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (denying the university’s motion to dismiss a 
male student’s Title IX claim relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Columbia 
University, reasoning that the federal government’s pressure, among other things, 
supports a Title IX claim). But see Doe v. Univ. of Colo., Boulder, though Bd. of 
Regents of Univ. of Colo., 255 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1074-79 (D. Colo. 2017) (citing 
cases dismissing male students’ Title IX claims and explaining the difference 
between “pro-victim” bias versus “anti-male” bias). 
203 See generally supra Part II. 
204 See 933 F.3d 849, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining how federal pressure 
to favor female accusers was not enough because the plaintiff’s complaint lacked 
“something more”). 
205 When this Comment discusses holding the federal government accountable, 
it necessarily refers to holding universities responsible for their role since they are 
the defendants in these lawsuits. However, the Seventh Circuit could have written in 
dicta how extensively the federal pressure on universities led to sex discrimination. 
By permitting lawsuits to proceed on this theory, even without such obvious and 
egregious facts as in Purdue University, the message to the federal government 
would be clear. 
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against male students in sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings, 
thus resulting in Purdue’s mistreatment of him. Second, it could have 
addressed commentators’ concerns over the potential emptiness of 
OCR’s threats in the Dear Colleague Letter given the lack of authority 
to enforce its terms.206 
 
A. The Financial Incentives Provision of Title IX, 
Together With the Dear Colleague Letter’s Terms, Is an 
Inescapable Violation of Title IX as Applied to Sexual 
Misconduct Disciplinary Proceedings. 
 
 An anonymous university student affairs administrator noted, 
not long after OCR published the Dear Colleague Letter, the following 
about the Letter’s impact on his or her job: 
 
[M]y  fear—yes, it’s fear—of seeing my institution’s 
name in Inside Higher Ed or The Chronicle of Higher 
Education as the subject of an investigation, or, even 
worse, having the “letter of agreement” OCR makes 
public displayed for all to read—makes me toe the line 
in a way I sometimes have trouble justifying to 
myself.207 
 
The terms of the Dear Colleague Letter are, however, only the first red 
flag; OCR’s efforts to enforce those terms are much more telling.208 
 
206 This argument is perhaps weaker with respect to Doe v. Purdue University 
and the other cases discussed supra Part II because the Department of Education’s 
lack of authority to enforce the Dear Colleague Letter’s mandates was never 
introduced in the plaintiff-students’ complaints. However, it is another avenue that 
could support future plaintiffs’ complaints’ sufficiency to survive motions to dismiss 
and is therefore worthy of discussion. 
207 Anonymous, Essay, An Open Letter to OCR, INSIDE HIGHER ED. (Oct. 28, 
2011), http:// www.insidehighered.com/views/2011/10/28/essay-ocr-guidelines-
sexual-assault-hurt-colleges-and-students. 
208 See Am. Ass’n of Univ. Professors, supra note 15, at 79-80 (explaining the 
impact of the Dear Colleague Letter on Title IX enforcement efforts). 
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About three years after OCR published the Dear Colleague Letter, “the 
OCR announced investigations of fifty-five colleges and universities 
for possible violations of Title IX in their handling of sexual violence 
and harassment complaints.”209 A year and a half later, in September 
2015, that number increased to 130.210 And another six months saw 
thirty-nine more schools added to the list of those being 
investigated.211 In other words, the pressure to conform to the OCR’s 
mandates was mounting quickly. 
 When the OCR concludes its investigations into universities’ 
Title IX compliance, it sets forth its findings “in long, detailed letters” 
to the institutions in question.212 In these letters, OCR explains 
schools’ failure to respond promptly enough to sexual misconduct 
allegations, failure to protect sexual assault complainants, and the 
general failure to “‘address the issue of sexual harassment and 
violence in the campus community,’” among other things.213 Through 
these letters, the OCR tells schools that they must conform to the 
OCR’s mandates in the manner recommended in the letters or else 
they risk losing their federal funding.214 
 As the American Association of University Professors put it, 
“the OCR’s approach to compliance has become increasingly 
punitive.”215 And “[t]he threatening nature of the OCR’s actions is 
fueled by the ever-broadening scope of its investigations, both in terms 
of the number of institutions under scrutiny and the breadth of the 
OCR’s investigations at each institution.”216 Put more bluntly, the 
OCR has managed to weaponize the financial incentives provision of 
 
209 Id. at 80. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 80. 
213 Id. at 80-81. 
214 See id. (“The OCR’s recent or current investigations . . . have taken on an 
adversarial character, leading to increasing fear that the OCR may wield its power to 
initiate proceedings to withdraw federal funding.” 
215 Id. at 81. 
216 Id. 
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Title IX to obtain total compliance. 
 The OCR’s actions have unquestionably extended beyond 
those contemplated by Congress in the early 1970s. As a result of the 
OCR’s attempts at cracking down on Title IX compliance, schools 
“‘scrambl[ed] to ensure compliance with [OCR’s] guidance and avoid 
becoming the subject of an OCR investigation.’”217 With hundreds of 
open investigations and blanket threats by the OCR about the potential 
for losing federal funding, whether and how schools would be found 
noncompliant with Title IX was a matter of great concern because it 
“remained a mystery even to most college officials.”218 
 In May 2016, a group of twenty-one professors from across the 
United States concluded that they had had enough.219 In a letter 
published online, the professors protested that the OCR “unlawfully 
expanded the nature and scope of institutions’ responsibility to address 
sexual harassment.”220 They concluded that the OCR has “compel[ed] 
institutions to choose between fundamental fairness for students and 
their continued acceptance of federal funding.”221 
 This is precisely the issue that is addressed in the case law 
discussed supra Part II, albeit less critically. Yet the case law 
considers the Dear Colleague Letter and the financial incentives aspect 
of Title IX compliance only as a “backdrop” that must be coupled with 
other specific reasons to believe that the school discriminated against 
the male student based on his sex.222 It is entirely understandable why  
courts tend to require more than just the pressure that the federal 
 
217 Harnik, supra note 80, at 674 (quoting Ariel Sullivan, Illegal Procedure? 
Title IX and Sexual Assault, NEW ENG. BD. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 16, 2015), 
https://nebhe.org/journal/illegal-procedure-title-ix-and-sexual-assault/). 
218 See id. 
219 See Law Professors’ Open Letter Regarding Campus Free Speech and 
Sexual Assault, at 1, 6-7 (May 16, 2016), 
https://www.lankford.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Law-Professor-Open-Letter-May-
16-2016.pdf [hereinafter Open Letter]. 
220 Id. at 1. 
221 Id. 
222 See Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 669 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Doe v. 
Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018)). 
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government places on schools, for if that were enough to state a claim 
of Title IX discrimination, then every male student in the country who 
has been disciplined in sexual misconduct proceedings would be able 
to sue their schools for Title IX discrimination. 
 The problem is instead that the courts, and particularly the 
Seventh Circuit, have failed to recognize the systematic discrimination 
against male students encouraged by the federal government since 
2011. Purdue University came to the right conclusion, but left open 
the door to the decision in Columbia College Chicago, where, against 
the same backdrop involving federal pressure, the court simply 
concluded that the particular facts did not sufficiently establish sex 
discrimination.223 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim that 
restricting access to investigative documentation indicated sex 
discrimination because they are “divorced from gender.”224 
 But that is the precise reason why courts apply the “backdrop” 
of the Dear Colleague Letter. It ought to go without saying that 
schools will not make decisions that obviously favor one gender over 
another, as that would be obvious sex discrimination. The backdrop 
offered by the Dear Colleague Letter and the financial duress it places 
schools under taints sexual misconduct disciplinary proceedings where 
the schools apply the changes demanded by the OCR. 
 The clearest example of this taint is with respect to the burden 
of proof requirement from the Dear Colleague Letter. The Letter 
defines noncompliance with Title IX to include any school that uses a 
burden of proof standard higher than “preponderance of the 
evidence.”225 Without explaining why the burden of proof to establish 
a public employer’s civil rights violation (preponderance of the 
evidence) should be the same as the burden of proof to establish that a 
student sexually harassed or assaulted another student, the OCR 
simply concludes that standards of proof higher than a preponderance 
of the evidence are always inconsistent with Title IX, even to prove 
 
223 See Doe v. Columbia Coll. Chic., 933 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2019). 
224 See id. 
225 See Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 11. 
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 The Dear Colleague Letter goes further. It also specifically 
requires that schools favor complaining victims over the students 
accused of misconduct.227 It requires that schools “afford[ ] a 
complainant a prompt and equitable resolution.”228 It requires that 
schools assure that they “will take steps to prevent recurrence of any 
harassment and to correct its discriminatory effects on the 
complainant.”229 It prohibits an accused’s access to due process 
protections from “restrict[ing] or unnecessarily delay[ing] the Title IX 
protections for the complainant.”230 It mandates that schools “take 
steps to protect the complainant as necessary” and “minimize the 
burden on the complainant.”231 It requires that schools “ensure that 
complainants are aware of their Title IX rights and any available 
resources, such as counseling, health, and mental health services.”232 
Ultimately, the Letter’s purpose is stated as follows: 
 
When OCR finds that a school has not taken prompt 
and effective steps to respond to sexual harassment or 
violence, OCR will seek appropriate remedies for both 
the complainant and the broader student population. . . . 
When a recipient [covered school] does not come into 
compliance voluntarily, OCR may initiate proceedings 
to withdraw Federal funding by the Department or refer 
the case to the U.S. Department of Justice for 
litigation.233 
 
Notably, all of these mandates, among others in the Letter, assume that 
 
226 See id. 
227 See id. at 8-9, 12, 15-16. 
228 Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
229 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
230 Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
231 Id. at 15-16 (emphasis added). 
232 Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
233 Id. (emphasis added). 
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accused students are guilty of the sexual misconduct allegations. They 
compel schools to favor complainants throughout the process, even at 
the cost of due process rights for the accused.234 
 As noted earlier, the Seventh Circuit came to the right 
conclusion in Purdue University. But it did not consider the systematic 
discrimination mandated—either directly or indirectly—by the Dear 
Colleague Letter. Given that there was evidence in the case that 
Purdue was under investigation by the OCR for failing to meet the 
standards set forth in the Dear Colleague Letter,235 the court could—
and indeed should—have found enough specific facts to believe that 
the systematic attempt at discriminating against males reached 
Purdue’s campus. Evidence of discrimination in a specific proceeding, 
as required in the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, should be 
satisfied with evidence that the university put in place changes in 
response to the Dear Colleague Letter. 
 The systematic attempt at discriminating against male students 
becomes worse still when courts begin recognizing that the federal 
government—tasked with representing the entirety of the country, not 
just complainants—threatens schools with devastation if they do not 
enforce policies that discriminate against a protected class. 
 
B. Having No Force of Law, the Dear Colleague Letter 
Instilled Fear Under False Pretenses. 
 
1. The OCR Failed to Publish the Dear Colleague 
Letter Under Appropriate Administrative 
Processes. 
 
To determine whether an agency action has the binding force 
of law, courts look to three factors in totality: (1) how the agency 
characterizes its action; (2) where the action was published; and (3) 
“whether the action has binding effects on private parties or on the 
 
234 See id. at 12. 
235 Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652, 668 (7th Cir. 2019). 
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agency.”236 The last factor, however, matters most.237 The inquiry that 
determines the Dear Colleague Letter’s legal weight most therefore 
rests on whether it was merely advisory, as the Letter claimed, or 
whether it was in effect a legislative rule.238 
 The Dear Colleague Letter expressly refers to itself as a 
“significant guidance document” that announced the OCR’s policy 
“about how [it] evaluate[d] whether covered entities [were] complying 
with their legal obligations.”239 The OCR’s own conclusion that the 
Letter is simply a statement of policy and nothing more does not save 
its attempt at creating a rule with the binding force of law.240 
 Notably, legislative rules trigger the need for formal notice-
and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act.241 
If an agency action “‘carries the force and effect of law,’” then the 
agency “‘may not escape the notice and comment requirements . . . by 
labeling a major substantive legal addition to a rule a mere 
interpretation.’”242 
 Professor Lave concludes that the Dear Colleague Letter is 
effectively a legislative rule that evaded notice-and-comment 
procedures.243 She points out eleven instances in which the Letter 
“tells schools that they must take certain steps in order to be in 
compliance with Title IX.”244 The Letter therefore “‘imposes binding 
obligations’ upon schools” by commanding, requiring, ordering, and 
 
236 Molycorp, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A., 197 F.3d 543, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
237 General Elec. Co. v. E.P.A., 290 F.3d 377, 382 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
238 Lave, supra note 72, at 943. 
239 Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 58, at 1 n.1. 
240 See General Elec. Co., 290 F.3d at 382 (explaining that, while courts 
consider how the agency characterizes its own statement, it is neither the only factor 
to consider nor the most important). 
241 See id. at 944. 
242 Id. (quoting Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000)). 
243 See id. at 945-47. 
244 Id. at 945. 
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dictating how schools are to act.245 Because such language also 
violates agency good practices guidelines, the circumstances militate 
in favor of recognizing the Letter as having the binding force of law. 
 Professor Lave points out that the Dear Colleague Letter “is 
procedurally invalid,” and thus “universities have no legal obligation 
to adhere to it.”246 And yet, the Department of Education, and 
specifically the OCR, have “made the consequences for not abiding by 
[the Dear Colleague Letter] so significant that it is effectively legally 
binding.”247 
Calling this “an unprecedented move,” Professor Lave explains 
how the OCR abused its executive authority by following through on 
its threat to schools.248 It began publishing lists of universities under 
investigation, which in turn “put tremendous financial and social 
pressure on schools to comply with the Dear Colleague Letter.249 It 
therefore did not matter whether schools thought the Dear Colleague 
Letter was valid because the ramifications of disregarding it were so 
devastating.250 
 In sum, it is likely that no court would enforce the OCR’s 
attempt at withdrawing federal funds from schools based on the Dear 
Colleague Letter. And yet the risk that such funding would be taken 
away outweighed any objections that schools had to the OCR’s 
mandates. The OCR’s threats to financially ruin schools that did not 
conform to its terms was therefore an empty one, but one that left 
schools with no realistic choice. 
 
2. Compelling Sex Discrimination By Putting 
Schools in Financial Duress Violates the 
Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
 




248 See id. at 947. 
249 Id. 
250 See id. 
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 The U.S. Constitution authorizes the federal government “to 
offer federal grant funds to states and localities that are contingent on 
the recipients engaging in, or refraining from, certain activities.”251 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that “the language in our earlier 
opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the [spending] 
power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that 
would themselves be unconstitutional.”252 
The Court added that “in some circumstances the financial 
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the 
point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”253 Where “states 
have no real choice but to accept the funding and enact or administer a 
federal program,” the federal government has violated the Spending 
Clause.254 Therefore, for example, “a grant of federal funds 
conditioned on invidiously discriminatory state action . . . would be an 
illegitimate exercise of the Congress’ broad spending power.”255 
The U.S. Supreme Court has invalidated federal funding in this 
light only once.256 In National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,257 the Court distinguished the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), 
so-called “Obamacare,” from the facts in Dole where the federal law 
simply encouraged the states to raise the drinking age to twenty-
one.258 The ACA, however, did more than “encourage” states to 
conform their individual Medicaid programs with the federal Medicaid 
law; the ACA’s financial inducement operated as “a gun to the 
 
251 Brian T. Yeh, The Federal Government’s Authority to Impose Conditions 
on Grant Funds, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44797.pdf.; see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 206 (1987) (explaining that the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
permits conditional spending). 
252 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (emphasis added). 
253 Id. at 211. 
254 Yeh, supra note 251, at 7 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. at 207, 211). 
255 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210-11. 
256 Yeh, supra note 251, at 11. 
257 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
258 See id. at 580-81. 
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head.”259 In fact, “[a] State that opt[ed] out of the [ACA]’s expansion 
in health care coverage thus [stood] to lose not merely ‘a relatively 
small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.”260 
Just as the threat to withdraw all federal Medicaid funding 
constituted a gun to the head of the States, and thus ran afoul of the 
Spending Clause, so too does the OCR’s threats to pull funding for 
noncompliance with Title IX. Here, however, the Department of 
Education has unequivocally conditioned the grant of federal funds on 
systematic discrimination against male students. It has, in other words, 
“compel[ed] institutions to choose between fundamental fairness for 
students and their continued acceptance of federal funding.”261 As in 
Sebelius, the Department of Education has effectively put a gun to the 
head of every school and forced them to discriminate against male 
students. This cannot be allowed to stand, and the Seventh Circuit 





 Sexual misconduct is, no doubt, worthy of punishment. It is 
certainly a principled and worthwhile cause to ensure that schools 
protect students from sexual violence to the best of their ability. But 
there comes a time when courts must step in to make sure that those 
righteous objectives are sought by righteous means. Because the 
federal government has attempted to accomplish those objectives in a 
manner that runs contrary to our sacred values of justice and fairness, 
courts must enjoin such detrimental activity. The Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Purdue University makes positive strides toward protecting 
the accused. As more students—both males and females—are hurt by 
their beloved universities in Title IX proceedings, courts will continue 
to have no choice but to hold all parties accountable. 
President Trump’s Administration began the process of reform 
 
259 Id. at 581. 
260 Id. 
261 Open Letter, supra note 219, at 6-7. 
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by rescinding the Dear Colleague Letter. But the Letter’s effects 
remain, and the fight will continue about how to best protect against 
sexual violence while maintaining fair and equitable disciplinary 
processes. Courts have a large role to play in this fight. Let’s hope 
they continue to pay attention to all perspectives in that fight, 
including the unpopular ones. 
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